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The 2015 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
were the latest maneuver by the conservative Supreme Court to pro-
tect big corporations, and will result in a meaningful restriction of
access to justice for individuals and those with limited means. Or,
perhaps, they were nothing more than minor language tinkering
that leaves judges free to continue their passive bystander approach
to case management-tinkering that does little to curb the abusive
discovery that leads defendants to make substantial settlement
payments to resolve meritless cases simply to avoid exploding liti-
gation costs. Stakeholders reading the same text and the same Ad-
visory Committee Notes regarding the 2015 amendments forecast
these polar, antithetical outcomes. So, who was right?
Data now exist to begin to understand how parties and courts
are actually applying the amended provisions: the amendments
have been in effect since December 1, 2015. The early results sug-
gest a staggering change in the frequency with which parties and
courts are applying proportionality to discovery requests to elimi-
nate or narrow discovery not because it is irrelevant, but because it
is too burdensome. Of course, the data do not reveal whether this
change is permanent, and leave other questions unanswered, but
they certainly suggest at least a short-term seismic shift in the ap-
plication of proportionality. As to the other changes, the data are
more mundane. This article presents the empirical data for all of
the material 2015 amendments. It also describes ome of the softer
gloss and themes emerging from these opinions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2010, two hundred judges, practitioners, and professors at-
tended a conference at Duke University to discuss improvements
to the pretrial process. They converged on three major deficits in
our civil litigation system, and summarized them as follows:
"What is needed can be described in two words-cooperation and
proportionality-and one phrase-sustained, active, hands-on ju-
dicial case management."' To remedy these three deficits, various
committees comprising the Judicial Conference of the United
States drafted, and the Supreme Court ultimately proposed, ex-
tensive amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with
a particular focus on the discovery rules.2
The proposed amendments sparked immediate and intense con-
troversy. The committee received a torrent of comments during
the public comment periods-over 2,300 written comments and
1. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE
2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 4 (2010).
2. Specifically, the 2015 amendments altered the text of Rules 1, 4, 16, 26, 30-34, 37,
and 55, and abrogated Rule 84 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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oral testimony from more than 120 witnesses.3 Some believed the
amendments were just the latest move by the Supreme Court to
protect big corporate defendants and limit plaintiffs' access to jus-
tice.4 Others believed the amendments did not go far enough in
curbing disproportionate and abusive discovery.5
Coming before the effective date of the amendments, those wild-
ly disparate assessments necessarily were purely speculative,
without any empirical support. The amendments have now been
in effect for more than a year,6 however, so it is now possible to
begin evaluating the actual, not predicted, effects of the 2015
amendments. In other words, we can begin to assess who was
right.
In order to explore whether the amendments have fostered
change (positive or negative), this article compares the courts' ap-
plication of the amended rules during the first year of their effec-
tiveness to the courts' rulings during the same one year period
immediately prior to their effectiveness. The article also examines
some of the trends and sometimes surprising directions the courts
have taken when applying these amendments.
For example, this article compares the courts' application of
proportionality during the twelve-month period from December
2014 through November 2015 with the courts' application of pro-
portionality during the twelve-month period from December 2015
through November 2016. By using parallel timeframes, confound-
ing factors like seasonal differences should be minimized.
It is important to note at the outset that this analysis only ex-
amines judicial opinions applying the amended provisions, and
does not attempt to capture behavior that is not reflected in such
opinions. Thus, for example, it is possible (although some would
3. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 14 (2014).
4. See, e.g., Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal
Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (2015); Hon. Craig B. Shaffer, The
"Burdens" of Applying Proportionality, 16 SEDONA CONF. J. 55, 69-70 (2015).
5. See, e.g., Mark W. Bennett, Essay: The Grand Poobah and Gorillas in Our Midst:
Enhancing Civil Justice in the Federal Courts-Swapping Discovery Procedures in the
Federal Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure and Other Reforms Like Trial by Agreement,
15 NEV. L.J. 1293, 1313 (2015); Edward D. Cavanagh, The 2015 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure: The Path to Meaningful Containment of Discovery Costs in Anti-
trust Litigation?, 13-APR ANTITRUST SOURCE 1, 7 (2014).
6. These amendments apply to cases pending on December 1, 2015, unless the court
"determines that applying them in a particular action would be infeasible or work an injus-
tice." See FED. R. CIV. P. 86(a)(2)(B). Courts adjudicating motions on or after December 1,
2015, have generally applied the amended rules, so the existing data does effectively repre-
sent a full year's experience in the courts.
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say unlikely) that parties have taken to heart the amendment to
Rule 1 suggesting that they construe the rules to effectuate the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of their cases and are
now voluntarily participating in the litigation process in a more
cooperative manner. Likewise, parties may be asserting propor-
tionality objections to discovery in cases where neither party sees
fit to bring the issue before the court (and thus that do not result
in a judicial opinion to be tallied). Indeed, those two concepts
might converge if, following a proportionality objection, the parties
meet and confer, then cooperatively agree to a scope of discovery
that is proportional to the needs of the case. That behavior, if oc-
curring, would be difficult for an external observer to discern, and
is outside the scope of this analysis. With that caveat in mind,
judicial opinions are likely a good barometer for the behavior of
the bar and bench generally on these procedural issues.
A few amendments particularly caught the attention of the law-
yers, scholars, and other stakeholders. This article will focus on
those controversial amendments, but will include all the provi-
sions that the courts have applied substantively. It does not ad-
dress two amendments designed to speed up the litigation process:
the amendments to Rules 47 and 168 shortening the time periods
for service of a complaint and issuance of the initial case manage-
ment order. These are important amendments, but are straight-
forward and have not resulted in any surprising or interesting ju-
dicial opinions. Similarly, amendments to Rules 169 and 26(f)10
added topics for the parties and the court to address at the outset
of cases, such as preservation of electronically stored information.
These amendments are helpful, but likewise have not generated
any noteworthy opinions, and are not discussed in this article.
The main body of this article will examine one-by-one the most
controversial of the 2015 amendments. For each amendment, the
article will, after describing the nature of the amendment, provide
the empirical comparison of the pre-amendment and post-
amendment data. The article will next describe the judicial gloss
that adds nuance and understanding not reflected in the raw
numbers. The article will wrap up the treatment of each rule
amendment with conclusions about the effectiveness, and effects,
of the amendment and how it fits into the larger picture of the
three Duke Conference objectives of promoting "cooperation and
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 4(m).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(2).
9. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(3).
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proportionality [and] sustained, active, hands-on judicial case
management." The article will conclude with an over-arching




Proportionality-the balancing of the benefits and burdens of
discovery-appeared to generate the most anticipatory angst" and
to have since achieved the greatest traction in the courts. Propor-
tionality is not a new concept in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure; proportionality has been in the rules since 1983.12 Propor-
tionality was initially situated in Rule 26(b)(1)-the provision es-
tablishing the scope of discovery-as a limitation on otherwise
discoverable information.13 The Advisory Committee Notes reflect
a concern about the cost of discovery, the prospect that these costs
were driving settlement of claims, and the need for greater judicial
involvement to police this excessively expensive discovery.14
The Supreme Court and the Advisory Committees did not per-
ceive the insertion of proportionality into the Rules to have cured
the problem of excessive discovery. Accordingly, the 1993
amendments moved the limits on discovery in Rule 26(b)(1), in-
cluding proportionality, into a separate section of limits in Rule
26(b)(2). 15 The 1993 amendment also expanded the list of factors
the courts could consider in assessing proportionality.1 6
11. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT OF THE DUKE CONFERENCE
SUBCOMMITTEE 3 (2014) [hereinafter DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT] ("This proposed change
provoked a stark division in the comments.").
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)(iii) (1983).
13. The initial iteration of proportionality read, "The frequency or extent of use of the
discovery methods set forth in subdivision (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines
that . . . (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." Id.
14. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 1983 amendment ("The
court must apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent use of discov-
ery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party, whether financially weak or
affluent. The rule contemplates greater judicial involvement in the discovery process and
thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot always operate on a self-regulating basis.").
15. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment ("Textual
changes are then made in new paragraph (2) to enable the court to keep tighter rein on the
extent of discovery. The information explosion of recent decades has greatly increased both
the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and the potential for discovery to be used as an
instrument for delay or oppression.").
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("The 1993
amendments added two factors to the considerations that bear on limiting discovery:
Summer 2017 311
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Still not satisfied, in 2000, the Supreme Court and the Advisory
Committees sought to strengthen the limitations on discovery in
Rule 26(b)(2), including proportionality, by adding a sentence to
the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) to the effect that all discov-
ery was subject to proportionality and the other limits in Rule
26(b)(2).17 The Advisory Committee Notes recognized that this
new language was superfluous, and was only added because the
courts did not seem to be applying the limitations rigorously
enough.1 8
Coming full circle, the 2015 amendments repositioned propor-
tionality from Rule 26(b)(2) back into Rule 26(b)(1), where it start-
ed.19 The Advisory Committee's articulated purpose of this reloca-
tion was, yet again, to foster more robust application of the doc-
trine.20 The Committee was concerned that, by moving propor-
tionality out of the definition of the scope of discovery in 1993, the
committee had inadvertently deemphasized the provision.2 1 The
amendment also reordered the proportionality factors, moving
"the importance of the issues at stake in the action" to the front of
the list, and adding consideration of "the parties' relative access to
relevant information" to the list.2 2
Some commentators worried that the broad scope of federal dis-
covery would be eroded by proportionality objections.23 Others
whether 'the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,' and
'the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues."').
17. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
18. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("[T]he
Committee had been told repeatedly that courts were not using these limitations as origi-
nally intended. 'This otherwise redundant cross-reference has been added to emphasize the
need for active judicial use of subdivision (b)(2) to control excessive discovery."').
19. Id.
20. Id. ("Restoring proportionality as an express component of the scope of discovery
warrants repetition of parts of the 1983 and 1993 Committee Notes that must not be lost
from sight. The 1983 Committee Note explained that '[t]he rule contemplates greater judi-
cial involvement in the discovery process and thus acknowledges the reality that it cannot
always operate on a self-regulating basis."').
21. Id. ("The clear focus of the 1983 provisions may have been softened, although inad-
vertently, by the amendments made in 1993. The 1993 Committee Note explained:
'[F]ormer paragraph (b)(1) [was] subdivided into two paragraphs for ease of reference and
to avoid renumbering of paragraphs (3) and (4). Subdividing the paragraphs, however, was
done in a way that could be read to separate the proportionality provisions as limitations,
no longer an integral part of the (b)(1) scope provisions."'); DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 11, at 6 ("The purpose of moving these factors explicitly into Rule 26(b)(1) is to
make them more prominent, encouraging parties and courts alike to remember them and
take them into account in pursuing discovery and deciding discovery disputes. If the ex-
pressions of concern reflect widespread disregard of principles that have been in the rules
for thirty years, it is time to prompt widespread respect and implementation.").
22. DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at 7.
23. Id. at 3 ("Those who wrote and testified about experience representing plaintiffs
saw proportionality as a new limit designed only to favor defendants. They criticized the
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believed that moving proportionality would not cause a meaning-
ful change in behavior or instill the balance missing from the dis-
covery process.2 4 Although the overall impact of the proportionali-
ty amendment on the federal civil justice system is not yet known,
the initial data suggest that the repositioning may have fostered
real change.
Three hundred thirty-five cases have applied the new propor-
tionality provision in the first year of amended Rule 26(b)(1). 2 5 Of
those cases, in 192 (5 7 %) the court restricted discovery in whole or
in part based on proportionality.26 By comparison, courts applied
proportionality 79 times and restricted discovery in 46 cases (58%)
during the pre-amendment comparison period. These numbers
suggest that parties and courts are applying proportionality more
than four times more frequently than before the amendments, and
that courts are narrowing discovery on proportionality grounds
more than four times more frequently post-amendment.2 7 Moreo-
ver, the data suggest that this increase in frequency may be accel-
erating-the final three months of the post-amendment period
contained the highest levels of the application of proportionality-
almost 4 0% higher than the average for the year.
factors from Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) as subjective and so flexible as to defy any uniform appli-
cation among different courts. They asserted that 'proportionality' will become a new au-
tomatic and blanket objection to all discovery requests, leading to increased motion practice
with attendant costs and delays. And they were particularly concerned that proportionality
would routinely defeat the rather extensive discovery ordinarily needed to prove many
claims that involve modest amounts of money but principles important not only to the
plaintiffs but also to the public interest.").
24. See, e.g., DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at Tab 2B, 52 ("Moving the
proportionality factors from Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to Rule 26(b)(1) 'does not effect any sub-
stantive change in the scope of discovery.' Rule 26(b)(1) now expressly invokes Rule
26(b)(2)(C) as a limit on all discovery.").
25. Many cases recite the amended language in their general statement of discovery
law. This analysis did not count a case as applying proportionality unless the court refer-
enced the doctrine in its analysis or discussion of the discovery at issue.
26. The analysis for this metric started with whether the court restricted discovery in
its ruling-so an opinion granting a motion to compel without limitation notwithstanding a
proportionality objection would automatically be deemed one not restricting discovery
based on proportionality. If the court's ruling limited discovery, then closer analysis was
necessary to determine whether proportionality (as opposed to relevance or some other
consideration) was the basis for the restriction. While court opinions are not always models
of clarity, and thus categorizing them often requires an exercise of judgment, this analysis
attempted to use a consistent yardstick for the pre- and post-amendment periods.
27. A natural question is whether the courts' docket size has changed over the past
year. Although the U.S. Courts reports are not current enough to answer this question, the
Justia Dockets and Filings website and the Judge Information Center run by Syracuse
University both suggest that filings during the post-amendment year were down between
three and five percent compared to the pre-amendment year, making the change, if any-
thing, greater than the raw numbers suggest.
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While it is difficult to deny the materiality of these numbers,
the data leave many questions unanswered. For example, only
time will tell whether this increased rate of application of propor-
tionality will accelerate over time, persist at current levels, or re-
turn to pre-amendment levels as the amendments are less in the
forefront of everyone's consciousness. Likewise, it is difficult to
determine whether the courts are reaching a different result be-
cause of the increased application of proportionality, or whether
they are reaching the same result for a different reason.
For example, a number of discovery rules address burdensome
discovery. Rule 26(c) allows a court to issue a protective order pro-
tecting a party from "undue burden."28  Similarly, Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(ii) instructs the court to limit discovery when the in-
formation can be obtained from a less burdensome source.29 Thus,
a court that viewed discovery as unduly burdensome prior to De-
cember 1, 2015, had the option to limit that discovery under three
different provisions in Rule 26: Rule 26(c); Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(ii); or
Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (where proportionality previously resided).
Now, that court might reach the same decision arising out of the
same concern about the burdensome nature of the discovery, but
might be more likely to base its ruling on proportionality because
that doctrine is in the spotlight. In other words, the outcome may
not have changed and the reason for the outcome-the court's per-
ception that the discovery is too burdensome-may not have
changed, but the courts may more frequently be framing their de-
cisions to narrow burdensome discovery under the proportionality
rubric.30
B. The Proportionality Judicial Gloss
In addition to the numerical increase in proportionality adjudi-
cations, the case law reveals some interesting judicial gloss on the
repositioned proportionality doctrine. For example, consistent
with the Advisory Committee Notes stating that the purpose of
the amendment was to promote more robust application of propor-
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii).
30. Indeed, case law reveals that the courts often conflate these different burdensome-
oriented provisions, using the term "undue burden" in their proportionality analysis, even
though that term appears only in other discovery provisions. See, e.g., Small v. Amgen,
Inc., No. 2:12-cv-476-FtM-29MRM, 2016 WL 7228863, at *7 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2016)
("[T]he Court finds that the proposed discovery is not proportional to the needs of this case.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Specifically, the Court finds that requiring Defendants to pro-
duce all discovery sought irrespective of the underlying indication would potentially impose
an undue and unacceptable burden on the Defendants.").
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tionality, and with the manner in which the courts have apparent-
ly taken this encouragement o heart, some courts are holding
that they have an independent duty to assess proportionality, even
if the parties do not raise it.3 1 This is a marked departure from the
courts' general practices, and may reflect the Supreme Court's en-
couragement hat judges take a more active, hands-on approach to
case management.
Perhaps the most significant judicial gloss involves the manner
of litigating a proportionality issue. The opinions are replete with
statements from the courts announcing that the relocation of pro-
portionality did not change the parties' respective burdens.32
Thus, the party resisting the discovery has the burden of proving
that the discovery should not be allowed.33 The change comes not
in an overt shifting of this burden, but in the manner in which
courts are requiring parties to support their positions regarding
proportionality.
Numerous courts have held that parties must submit evidence
to support their contentions regarding the proportionality factors,
not just legal argument.34 This requirement has converted many
discovery motions from contests of legal argument to evidentiary
proceedings, fundamentally changing the manner in which parties
must litigate proportionality. Moreover, this requirement of evi-
dentiary support applies to both the moving party and the oppos-
ing party-regardless of which party has the initial burden, the
opposing party will simply lose if it does not counter the moving
party's evidence with evidence of its own. Thus, both parties now
must submit evidence supporting their positions on proportionali-
ty. 35
31. See, e.g., Curtis v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., No. 3:15-cv-2328-B, 2016 WL 687164, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Feb. 19, 2016) (holding that a court must limit disproportionate discovery even
in the absence of a motion); Arcelormittal Ind. Harbor LLC v. Amex Nooter, LLC, No. 2:15-
CV-195-PRC, 2016 WL 614144, at *6-7 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 16, 2016).
32. See Wilmington Tr. Co. v. AEP Generating Co., No. 2:13-CV-01213, 2016 WL
860693 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2016); Curtis, 2016 WL 687164, at *3.
33. Wilmington Tr. Co., 2016 WL 860693, at *2; Curtis, 2016 WL 687164, at *3 (holding
that a party that opposes a discovery request on the basis of proportionality must come
forward with specific information, to the extent that such information is available, to ad-
dress the proportionality factors).
34. See, e.g., Gregory v. Gregory, No. 2:15-CV-0320 (WHW)(CLW), 2016 WL 6122456,
at *10 (D. N.J. Oct. 18, 2016) (finding that the plaintiff failed to submit evidence of the cost
of responding, much less evidence that the cost would be "excessive or unwarranted"); VHT,
Inc. v. Zillow Grp., Inc., No. C15-1096JLR, 2016 WL 7077235, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 8,
2016) ("[T]he dearth of evidence on the record supporting Zillow's position renders that
information negligibly relevant, minimally important in resolving the issues, and unduly
burdensome.").
35. See Wilmington Tr. Co., 2016 WL 860693, at *2 ("Courts have, in evaluating the
proportionality issue, suggested that both parties have some stake in addressing the vari-
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C. The Proportionality Assessment
Chief Justice Roberts emphasized his belief that both parties
and judges need to exercise "increased reliance on the common-
sense concept of proportionality" in his 2015 Year-End Report on
the Federal Judiciary.36 Surprisingly, the simple movement of the
existing proportionality clause from one subsection of Rule 26(b) to
another, with virtually no alteration to the clause's language, ap-
pears to be accomplishing Justice Roberts's goal. Indeed, this re-
positioning-perhaps along with the encouragement of the Chief
Justice-has had a greater effect than any of the other changes in
the 2015 amendments. The fourfold increase in judicial opinions
applying proportionality to restrict discovery is difficult to trivial-
ize. Furthermore, the data suggest that the increased application
of proportionality may be increasing over time-after a modest
start immediately after the effective date of the amendments, the
rate of application soared by almost 40% in the last quarter of the
comparison year.
The effectiveness of the proportionality amendment is further
demonstrated by the judges who concluded that they have an in-
dependent duty to assess the proportionality of discovery requests
even if the parties do not raise the issue. While Rule 26 has im-
posed the duty on each court to limit inappropriate discovery "on
motion or on its own,"37 judges have rarely imposed discovery lim-
its sua sponte in the past. Only time will tell whether these
changes stick or whether proportionality gradually fades from the
consciousness of the parties and the judges.
Proportionality was one of the three core needs of proportionali-
ty, cooperation, and active judicial case management to improve
the civil litigation system identified at the Duke Conference, and
it received the most pointedly specific mandate-amended Rule
26(b)(1) includes proportionality as a mandatory limitation on the
scope of all discovery. The Supreme Court's success at achieving
greater proportionality largely hinges on the effectiveness of the
amendment to Rule 26(b)(1), and at present, it appears that the
ous relevant factors."); Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. 10-cv-03561-WHA (DMR),
2015 WL 7775243, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2015).
36. C.J. JOHN G. ROBERTS, JR., 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7
(2015) ("The amended rule states, as a fundamental principle, that lawyers must size and
shape their discovery requests to the requisites of a case . . . . That assessment may, as a
practical matter, require the active involvement of a neutral arbiter-the federal judge-to
guide decisions respecting the scope of discovery.").
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added).
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Spoliation sanctions have been a topic of much discussion over
the past several years.38 Prior to December 1, 2015, courts im-
posed sanctions for spoliation either through their general powers
over cases on their dockets or, if they had entered a preservation
order, through their sanctioning authority under Rule 37(b) for a
violation of a discovery order.39 The only provision in the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly touching on spoliation was Rule
37(e), which contained a narrow safe harbor for the destruction of
electronically stored information ("ESI") through the routine oper-
ation of a computer system.40 As a consequence, courts were in-
consistent regarding the standard for spoliation sanctions, with
some courts imposing them for mere negligence41 and others re-
quiring a heightened degree of misconduct.42
New Rule 37(e) contains a national standard for spoliation of
ESI. It establishes three prerequisites for any sanctions for spoli-
ation of ESI: (1) the party failing to preserve the ESI must have
had a duty to preserve it; (2) the ESI must have been "lost because
the party failed to take reasonable steps to preserve" it (i.e., the
ESI was lost through negligence, not a server being destroyed
through flooding or a lightning strike); and (3) the ESI "cannot be
restored or replaced through additional discovery."43 If all three
prerequisites are satisfied, amended Rule 37(e) creates two tiers of
sanctions. It only allows the most severe sanctions-dispositive
sanctions (dismissal or judgment) or an adverse inference instruc-
tion to the jury-upon a finding of intent to deprive an opponent of
the use of the lost evidence in the litigation.44 Otherwise, sanc-
38. See, e.g., Tristan Evans-Wilent, Note, The Electronic Document Retention System
Ate My Homework: Gross Negligence and the Rebuttable Presumption of Prejudice Within
the Doctrine of Spoliation in Federal Courts, 87 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1193 (2013).
39. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b); Guard Ins. Grp., Inc. v. Techtronic Indus. Co., 80 F.
Supp. 3d 497, 503 (W.D.N.Y. 2015).
40. See, e.g., Lee v. Max Int'l., LLC, 638 F.3d 1318, 1322 (10th Cir. 2011).
41. See, e.g., Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir.
2002) (authorizing the giving of adverse-inference instructions on a finding of negligence or
gross negligence).
42. Stepnes v. Ritschel, 663 F.3d 952, 965 (8th Cir. 2011) (requiring bad faith); Rimkus
Consulting Grp., Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 614 (S.D. Tex. 2010) (same).
43. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
44. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(2).
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tions are limited to those necessary to cure prejudice to opposing
parties, and may not include dispositive sanctions or an adverse
inference instruction.4 5
With this amendment to Rule 37(e), sanctions for spoliation of
ESI will, by rule, become more uniform, and case law confirms
that courts across the country are now consistently applying the
same standard for spoliation sanctions related to ESI.46 The open
question is whether the amendment caused the frequency of the
various sanctions to change.
Courts adjudicated 54 motions for sanctions in their first year of
applying amended Rule 37(e).4 7 The court awarded some sanction
in 26 of those, 14 of which were an adverse inference instruction.
During the comparison period, courts adjudicated 54 motions for
spoliation sanctions, awarding sanctions in 27, 14 of which were
an adverse inference instruction. These data suggest that, while
the amendment to Rule 37(e) created a uniform standard for sanc-
tions for spoliation of ESI, the amendment has not altered the
overall frequency of requests for sanctions for spoliation of ESI,
imposition of sanctions for spoliation of ESI, or the severity of
sanctions for spoliation of ESI that the courts have imposed.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)(1).
46. See, e.g., Best Payphones, Inc. v. N.Y.C., No. 1-CV-3924 (JG)(VMS), 2016 WL
792396, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2016) (recognizing that negligence or even gross negligence
can no longer support an adverse inference instruction as a sanction for the spoliation of
ESI). There are cases where courts continue to apply case law standards instead of Rule
37(e) to the failure to preserve ESI. See, e.g., Bordegaray v. City of Santa Barbara, No.
2:14-cv-8610-CAS (JPRx), 2016 WL 7260920, at *5-6 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2016) (applying
older case law precedent instead of Rule 37(e) to spoliation of electronic data from a police
car in an excessive force case); Estate of Romain v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms, No. 14-
12289, 2016 WL 7664226, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 22, 2016) (applying older case law prece-
dent instead of Rule 37(e) to spoliation of Google search images).
47. As originally framed, amended Rule 37(e) would have addressed spoliation sanc-
tions for all forms of evidence, not just ESI. DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, at
370-71. In response to comments that spoliation sanctions were uniquely problematic with
ESI and that the current regime was working appropriately for spoliation of paper docu-
ments, the Advisory Committee revised the proposed amendment and limited its scope to
spoliation of ESI. Accordingly, while the articulated purpose of the amendment was to
promote a nationally-consistent standard, the Advisory Committee created an odd dichoto-
my where failure to preserve a paper copy of a letter is potentially subject to sanctions
under a court-developed standard that varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and failure to
preserve the same letter in electronic form is subject to an entirely separate set of consider-
ations found in Rule 37(e). See Best Payphones, Inc., 2016 WL 792396, at *4 (applying two
different standards to allegations of failure to preserve ESI and non-ESI in the same case).
Some courts have addressed this odd result by applying Rule 37(e) to spoliation of paper
documents as well, even though it does not apply on its face. See Mcqueen v. Aramark
Corp., No. 2:15-CV-492-DAK-PMW, 2016 WL 6988820, at *3 (D. Utah Nov. 29, 2016)
(applying 37(e) when both ESI and paper were lost). Because of the limitation in amended
Rule 37(e) to ESI, this article compares cases under amended Rule 37(e) to cases in the
comparison period addressing allegations of ESI spoliation, to keep the comparison "apples
to apples."
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Thus, the data suggest that the amendment to Rule 37(e) had pre-
cisely the effect that the Advisory Committee advanced as its
goal-to establish a uniform standard without either promoting or
squelching spoliation sanctions.
B. The Spoliation Judicial Gloss
Although the 2015 amendments appear to have created greater
uniformity in ESI spoliation sanctions without altering the fre-
quency of these sanctions, the amendments have also yielded some
unexpected developments in the case law applying them. As with
proportionality, the nature of the showing that parties need to
make to support or oppose a spoliation motion is evolving.
The threshold issue in this regard is which party has the burden
of proof or persuasion as to the various prerequisites and consid-
erations under Rule 37(e). Rule 37(e) is silent on the parties' bur-
dens, and the Advisory Committee Notes suggest that the courts
have discretion to assign burdens on a case-by-case basis.48 Some
courts are assigning the burden to the moving party, as would be
typical of a spoliation motion prior to the amendments.49 Howev-
er, some courts are shifting the burden onto the nonmoving party
to demonstrate the absence of prejudice.5 0  Furthermore, some
judges are instructing the parties to develop a more complete rec-
ord when they deem the parties' submissions inadequate to make
the findings required under Rule 37(e).5 1
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("The rule does
not place a burden of proving or disproving prejudice on one party or the other. Determin-
ing the content of lost information may be a difficult task in some cases, and placing the
burden of proving prejudice on the party that did not lose the information may be unfair.
In other situations, however, the content of the lost information may be fairly evident, the
information may appear to be unimportant, or the abundance of preserved information may
appear sufficient to meet the needs of all parties. Requiring the party seeking curative
measures to prove prejudice may be reasonable in such situations. The rule leaves judges
with discretion to determine how best to assess prejudice in particular cases.").
49. See, e.g., Richard v. Inland Dredging Co., No. 6:15-0654, 2016 WL 5477750, at *4
(W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2016); Martinez v. City of Chi., 2016 WL 3538823, at *24 (N.D. Ill. June
29, 2016).
50. See Mcqueen, 2016 WL 6988820, at *3 (holding that where the precise nature of lost
documents cannot be determined, the party failing to preserve cannot show lack of preju-
dice).
51. See, e.g., Gonzalez-Bermudez v. Abbott Labs. PR Inc., 214 F. Supp. 3d 130, 161-63
(D. P.R. 2016) ("Having not yet shown that she is entitled to an adverse inference, Plain-
tiffs request is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE."); Konica Minolta Bus. Sols., U.S.A.
Inc. v. Lowery Corp., No. 15-CV-11254, 2016 WL 4537847, at *5-6 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 31,
2016) (holding that further discovery was required to determine whether reasonable steps
were taken to preserve the ESI and whether the ESI can be replaced through additional
discovery); Bagley v. Yale Univ., No. 3:13-CV-1890 (CSH), 2016 WL 3264141, at *19 (D.
Conn. June 14, 2016), as amended (June 15, 2016) (reserving a decision on the spoliation
motion until the nonmovant defendant produced proof of its preservation efforts).
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A related question is who decides whether the conditions in
Rule 37(e) are satisfied-the judge or the jury? Rule 37(e) is again
silent on who makes the determinations it requires, but the Advi-
sory Committee Notes suggest that the judge has the option of
sending issues like intent to the jury.5 2 Despite this implicit au-
thority, judges have decided the vast majority of the post-2015
Rule 37(e) motions.
In Cahill v. Dart,53 however, the judge allowed the jury to decide
whether the spoliating party had the intent to affect the litigation
as part of the Rule 37(e) analysis. The judge was concerned that
the finding of intent to destroy the evidence was closely related to
the plaintiffs claims for false arrest and malicious prosecution.
Accordingly, the judge wrote that, "the best course is for the jury
to decide the question of intent."54 Although the judge did not ex-
plicitly reference the Seventh Amendment, this case highlights
one important consideration in deciding whether to involve the
jury in the Rule 37(e) determinations.
The courts are also divided on the extent to which any sanction-
ing authority outside of Rule 37(e) remains for spoliation of ESI.5 5
Historically, courts used either their inherent powers over cases
on their docket or, if they had issued a preservation order with
which a party failed to comply, their authority under Rule 37(b) to
sanction parties for failing to comply with discovery orders.56
Thus, the question is whether either of these sources remains
available following the amendment of Rule 37(e).
Regarding whether courts may continue to use their inherent
authority to sanction parties for spoliation of ESI, some courts
have held that Rule 37(e) forecloses the exercise of that inherent
authority.57 Other courts deem the remedy in Rule 37(e) cumula-
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("If a court were
to conclude that the intent finding should be made by a jury, the court's instruction should
make clear that the jury may infer from the loss of the information that it was unfavorable
to the party that lost it only if the jury first finds that the party acted with the intent to
deprive another party of the information's use in the litigation. If the jury does not make
this finding, it may not infer from the loss that the information was unfavorable to the
party that lost it.").
53. No. 13-cv-361, 2016 WL 7034139 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 2, 2016).
54. Id. at *4.
55. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 2015 amendment o Rule 37(e) state that the
new provision "does not affect the validity of an independent tort claim for spoliation if
state law applies in a case and authorizes the claim." This article focuses on spoliation
sanctions within the existing litigation, rather than such independent tort claims.
56. See McIntosh v. United States, No. 14-CV-7889 (KMK), 2016 WL 1274585, at *30
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2016).
57. See Ala. Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Boeing Co., 319 F.R.D. 730, 740 (N.D. Ala. 2017)
(holding that the Advisory Committee Notes foreclose reliance on the court's inherent au-
thority); Marshall v. Dentfirst, P.C., 313 F.R.D. 691, 694 (N.D. Ga. 2016) ("This amendment
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tive to other sanctioning authorities.58 Cases falling in this latter
category appear to be in direct conflict with the Advisory Commit-
tee Notes,59 and may disappear over time, but for now this re-
mains an open issue.
Whether courts may impose the sanctions in Rule 37(b) if they
have issued a preservation order remains unanswered. This is an
important question. Rule 37(b) not only contains a lengthy list of
approved sanctions, it also accords the courts almost complete dis-
cretion to combine the sanctions on the list or to impose any other
sanctions they deem "just."6 0 Thus, the potential to use Rule 37(b)
to expand the sanctions criteria and options beyond those author-
ized under Rule 37(e) could significantly undermine the policy ob-
jective behind the 2015 amendments to Rule 37(e) to create a uni-
form and predictable standard for ESI spoliation sanctions.
Case law also raises some anomalies that the Advisory Commit-
tee may not have intended to create, and may want to remedy.
First, all of the other sanctioning authorities in Rule 37 provide
for the award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a discov-
ery motion.61 Rule 37(e) contains no provision authorizing an
award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party in a sanctions mo-
tion, and at least one court has held that such an award would be
improper.62 This anomalous lack of authority for an attorney's
fees in Rule 37(e) seems like an oversight, and may be corrected by
the Advisory Committee or the courts over time.
'forecloses reliance on inherent authority or state law to determine when certain measures
should be used' to address spoliation of electronically stored information.").
58. Cohn v. Guaranteed Rate, Inc., 318 F.R.D. 350, 353-54 (N.D. Ill. 2016) ("Rule 37(e)
describes some of the remedies that a court may order in the event that electronically
stored information is destroyed . . . . The Court also has broad, inherent power to impose
sanctions for failure to produce discovery and for destruction of evidence, over and above
the provisions of the Federal Rules."); CAT3, LLC v. Black Lineage, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d
488, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) ("Where exercise of inherent power is necessary to remedy abuse
of the judicial process, it matters not whether there might be another source of authority
that could address the same issue."). See also Helget v. City of Hays, Kan., 844 F.3d 1216,
1225-26 (10th Cir. 2017) (discussing pre-amendment case law instead of Rule 37(e) for
failure to preserve internet-usage and email history).
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment (Rule 37(e)
"authorizes and specifies measures a court may employ if information that should have
been preserved is lost, and specifies the findings necessary to justify these measures. It
therefore forecloses reliance on inherent authority or state law to determine when certain
measures should be used.").
60. See Valley Eng'rs Inc. v. Elec. Eng'g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 1998).
61. Rule 37(a)(5) provides for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party on a
motion to compel and Rule 37(b)(2)(B) provides for an award of attorney's fees to the pre-
vailing party on a motion for sanctions for failure to comply with a court order. Rules
37(c)(1)(C) and 37(d)(3) incorporate the sanctions from Rule 37(b).
62. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Cuker Interactive, LLC, No. 5:14-CV-5262, 2017 WL
239341, at *2 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 19, 2017).
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Second, the prerequisites in Rule 37(e) may create an unintend-
ed opening for parties to avoid the consequences of their improper
conduct. In Marquette Transportation Company Gulf Island, LLC
v. Chembulk Westport M/V, the plaintiff claimed that the defend-
ant operated its vessel at excessive speed, causing the plaintiffs
vessel to flood and capsize.63 In discovery, the plaintiff sought a
copy of the data from the defendant vessel's Voyage Data Record-
er, or VDR. 6 4 The defendant produced a thumb drive that did not
contain audio or radar data from the time of the incident. The de-
fendant refused to allow the plaintiffs expert to download the ves-
sel's VDR data, but the court ordered the download.65 The plain-
tiffs expert opined that data had been deleted deliberately. Dur-
ing depositions, the plaintiff learned that a DVD had been created
containing all the data from the VDR, and the plaintiff pursued,
and eventually obtained, a copy of the DVD. 6 6 The plaintiff then
sought sanctions for the defendant's conduct. Despite evidence
potentially establishing an intent to affect the litigation, the court
found that sanctions were unavailable under Rule 37(e). Before
any sanctions may be awarded, the court reasoned, the moving
party must demonstrate that the ESI cannot be "restored or re-
placed."6 7 Because the plaintiff ultimately obtained a copy of the
missing data, it could not satisfy this prerequisite for sanctions
under Rule 37(e).68
Judge Roby's construction of Rule 37(e) in Marquette seems
faithful to the language of the Rule. At the same time, it creates a
perverse incentive to spoliate unhelpful ESI, then to retrieve it
from a backup server if sanctions appear to be forthcoming, and
thereby avoid the sanctions.69 Rule 37(e) should not excuse a par-
ty from spoliation sanctions simply because the party, upon being
caught, somehow "finds" a copy of the previously lost ESI, and the
Advisory Committee or the courts should close this loophole.
Finally, another open question involves the application of pro-
portionality to spoliation sanctions. Although the Advisory Com-
mittee Notes express an intent to have proportionality factor into
63. No. 13-6216 c/w 14-2071, 2016 WL 930946 (E.D. La. Mar. 11, 2016).
64. Id. at *1.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at *3.
68. Id.
69. Of course, a deliberate exercise of this strategy might trigger other forms of sanc-
tion, such as a sanction for violating the signature certification in Rule 26(g). The availa-
bility of such sanctions depends on the circumstances, but does not alter the fact that Rule
37(e) likely has an unintended loophole.
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the Rule 37(e) analysis,70 Rule 37(e) does not expressly use the
term. The most likely avenue for introduction of proportionality
lies in the prerequisite requiring that the spoliating party have
failed to take "reasonable" steps to preserve the ESI. Courts
might evaluate the reasonableness of the steps taken under the
proportionality factors in Rule 26(b)(1). This concept has not yet
found its way into the courts' analysis at an explicit level.71
C. The Spoliation Assessment
Along with the proportionality amendment, he new ESI spolia-
tion provision in Rule 37(e) has effected the greatest change in
federal civil litigation among the 2015 amendments. The amend-
ment set out to address the inconsistency among the courts in the
standard for spoliation sanctions, and-with the exception of a few
quirks in the case law that will likely resolve over time-Rule
37(e) accomplishes that objective. Furthermore, it appears to have
done so in a manner that changed the standard for spoliation
sanctions, but not the frequency with which parties sought, or the
courts awarded, those sanctions.7 2
While successful in setting a single national standard, the
amendment contains some gaps and ambiguities that the Su-
preme Court should address by further refining the amendment.
Although the amendment accomplishes uniformity of sanctions for
spoliation of ESI, it makes no sense to have two different sets of
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e) advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("Another factor
in evaluating the reasonableness of preservation efforts is proportionality. The court
should be sensitive to party resources; aggressive preservation efforts can be extremely
costly, and parties (including governmental parties) may have limited staff and resources to
devote to those efforts. A party may act reasonably by choosing a less costly form of infor-
mation preservation, if it is substantially as effective as more costly forms. It is important
that counsel become familiar with their clients' information systems and digital data-
including social media-to address these issues. A party urging that preservation requests
are disproportionate may need to provide specifics about these matters in order to enable
meaningful discussion of the appropriate preservation regime.").
71. In FTC v. DirecTV Inc., No. 15-cv-01129-HSG (MEJ), 2016 WL 7386133, at *5
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 21, 2016), the court's opinion might be read to suggest that matter that is
not proportional need not be preserved. That approach seems misguided. The duty to
preserve is determined by the applicable body of law, and may not include a proportionality
component. The requirement to take reasonable steps to preserve relevant matter seems
like a much more logical place to introduce proportionality considerations.
72. Of course, the question of whether the standard in Rule 37(e), requiring specific
intent for the most severe sanctions and limiting other sanctions to those necessary to cure
any prejudice caused by the spoliation, is open to debate. The lower threshold set by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial
Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002), allowing adverse inference or case-concluding sanctions
based on ordinary negligence, was a minority viewpoint that the Advisory Committee and
Supreme Court explicitly rejected. Regardless of one's view of the appropriate threshold,
however, a uniform standard is appropriate across the federal courts.
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spoliation rules for ESI and other types of evidence. It is frequent-
ly the case that documents exist in both paper and electronic for-
mat. Under the current framework, if a party failed to preserve
both, the court might need to conduct two different sanctions
analyses and might be compelled to impose two different sets of
sanctions. Not only would that exercise be wasteful, it could in-
troduce confusion to the jury as well-the jury might, for example,
be instructed to presume that the paper copy contained infor-
mation harmful to the spoliating party, but not to make the same
presumption for the electronic copy. Additionally, Rule 37(e)
should contain an attorney's fees provision, and arguably a meet
and confer requirement, like the other sanctions provisions in
Rule 37. Finally, the Rule might be improved by some thoughtful
language regarding the burden of proof and potential role of the
jury in the factual aspects of the Rule 37(e) analysis.
The spoliation sanctions amendment does not directly address
any of the three Duke Conference core needs of proportionality,
cooperation, and active judicial case management (although one
could argue that it tangentially advances proportionality). Thus,
while the 2015 amendment to Rule 37(e) successfully accom-
plished the important objective of creating a uniform national
standard, it did not materially advance any of the three core defi-
cits of the civil litigation system.
IV. COOPERATION-RULE 1
A. The Data
Rule 1 contains the iconic, and largely aspirational, language
requiring that the rules be construed to secure the "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."73
The amendment expressly extends that duty to the parties,
whereas the prior language could be read to apply only to the
courts. The amendment to Rule 1 was the Advisory Committee's
primary attempt to foster greater cooperation, and scholars have
criticized this amendment as unlikely to have any material ef-
fect.74
In the first year following the 2015 amendments' effectiveness,
courts discussed amended Rule 1 in 432 cases. In the majority,
the court either mentioned the rule in general background (e.g.,
73. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
74. See Bennett, supra note 5, at 1313.
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"Summary judgment is not a disfavored remedy, See Rule 1")75 or
admonished the parties to be mindful of Rule 1's strictures going
forward.7 6 In 177 cases (41%), however, the court included Rule 1
among the grounds supporting its ruling on issues like whether to
grant requests for extensions of time.77 By comparison, courts dis-
cussed Rule 1 389 times in the comparison year prior to the
amendments' effective date, and based their rulings on Rule 1 in
161 (41%) of those cases. Thus, courts invoked Rule 1 more fre-
quently post-amendment than they did before the amendment, but
the difference is small enough as to be likely meaningless.
B. The Cooperation Judicial Gloss
The Advisory Committee Note accompanying the 2015 amend-
ment to Rule 1 is quite short-consisting of two spare para-
graphs-and does not illuminate much about the Committee's
thought processes. The Note does suggest that the amendment,
by adding an express reference to the parties' obligations to con-
strue the rules to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolu-
tion of matters, was designed to foster greater cooperation.7 8 As
discussed above, the data do not show any significant numerical
increase in the application of Rule 1. Moreover, it is difficult to
discern any evidence of increased cooperation in the reported opin-
ions discussing Rule 1.79
75. See, e.g., Krajcsik v. Ramsey, No. MJG-15-3708, 2017 WL 3868560, at *2 (D. Md.
Sept. 5, 2017) ("When evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must bear in
mind that the 'summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored pro-
cedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are
designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."" (quot-
ing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (quoting Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure))).
76. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Feaster v. Dopps Chiropratic Clinic, LLC, No. 13-cv-
1453-EFM-KGG, 2016 WL 6462041, at *6 (D. Kan. Nov. 1, 2016); Scranton Products, Inc.
v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d 419, 427 (M.D. Pa. 2016).
77. See, e.g., Vanderklok v. United States, No. 15-00370, 2016 WL 1720449, at *2 (E.D.
Pa. Apr. 29, 2016).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. I advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("Most lawyers and
parties cooperate to achieve these ends. But discussions of ways to improve the admin-
istration of civil justice regularly include pleas to discourage over-use, misuse, and abuse of
procedural tools that increase cost and result in delay. Effective advocacy is consistent
with-and indeed depends upon-cooperative and proportional use of procedure.").
79. Obviously, issues tend to come before the court when the parties are not cooperat-
ing and the process is not running smoothly-that is when parties tend to file motions and
the courts tend to issue opinions. Thus, it is not surprising that the vast majority of opin-
ions that discuss whether the parties are complying with Rule 1 criticize one of the par-
ties-or both parties-for failing to uphold the spirit of Rule 1. The lack of any meaningful
change in the number of these cases is strong evidence that the parties have not, as a result
of the 2015 amendment o Rule 1, suddenly started "playing well together." The research
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Although the Rule 1 opinions do not demonstrate increased co-
operation, they do contain some noteworthy jurisprudence. The
Advisory Committee Notes explicitly state that the amendment to
Rule 1 does not create a new basis for sanctions; a party cannot
file a successful motion asking the court to sanction an opposing
party because the opposing party is applying the rules in a man-
ner that causes delay or unnecessary costs in violation of Rule 1.80
The natural question, then, is not whether parties have started
seeking sanctions under Rule 1-in direct contravention of the
Committee Note-but whether they are using violations of Rule 1
to support motions for sanctions under other sanctioning authori-
ty.81 The case law reflects that both parties and the courts are
citing violations of Rule 1 as support for sanctions under another
rule. For example, courts are regularly citing conduct inconsistent
with Rule 1-such as discovery conduct that causes delay or drives
up the cost of litigation-as part of the basis for their decisions to
impose sanctions under Rule 37.82 Likewise, the failure to uphold
the goals of Rule 1 has been cited as part of the basis for an award
of sanctions under the court's contempt power in 18 U.S.C. § 401,83
for this article did not uncover any instances of the court praising the parties for their new-
found cooperative spirit.
80. FED. R. CIV. P. I advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("This amendment
does not create a new or independent source of sanctions.").
81. The Advisory Committee Note suggests that such a tactic is not improper. FED. R.
CIV. P. I advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment (explaining that while the amend-
ment does not create a new sanctioning authority, "neither does it abridge the scope of any
other of these rules.").
82. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Wu, No. 11-cv-04988-JSW, 2016 WL 4943000, at
*2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2016) (citing Rule 1 violations as supporting "termination sanctions"
under Rule 37). See also Century Sur. Co. v. Nafel, No. 3:14-CV-00101-JWD-EWD, 2016
WL 4059678, at *9 (M.D. La. July 28, 2016) (holding that with Rule I's objectives "so firmly
embedded in the Rules . . . this Court must find that [the defendant] contravened his dis-
covery obligations, triggering Rule 37."); Hardy v. GlobalOptions Servs., Inc., No. 2:14-cv-
00513-APG-CWH, 2016 WL 4154943, at *2 (D. Nev. July 15, 2016) (listing Rule 1 as a
basis for sanctions under Rules 16 and 37); Thomas v. FTS USA, LLC, No. 3:13cv825, 2016
WL 3566657, at *12 (E.D. Va. June 24, 2016) (listing Rule 1 violations as a basis for sanc-
tions under Rule 37); Greene v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-00677-JAD-NJK, 2016
WL 829981, at *5 (D. Nev. Jan. 26, 2016) ("As the text of Rule 1 now makes explicit, the
duty to strive toward that goal is shared by the Court and the parties. It is with that
charge as a guide that courts construe and administer the Rules. There are several mecha-
nisms by which this goal can be accomplished, including entering case-dispositive sanctions
against a party who fails to comply with the Rules or unnecessarily multiplies the proceed-
ings.") (citations omitted).
83. N. States Power Co. agent of Xcel Energy v. TriVis, Inc., No. 16-51 (DSD/BRT),
2016 WL 2621953, at *5 (D. Min. May 6, 2016).
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an award of attorney's fees,8 4 involuntary dismissal under Rule
41(b),85 and the court's decision to award Rule 11 sanctions.8 6
Conversely, courts also use Rule 1 regularly to excuse minor
transgressions of other rules. So, for example, in AK Steel Corpo-
ration v. PAC Operating Limited Partnership, the court based its
decision to overlook a party's failure to seek leave to amend a
pleading on Rule 1 considerations.8 7 Likewise, in In re: Ex Parte
Application of Pro-Sys Consultants and Neil Godfrey, the court
allowed an alternate form of service of a subpoena to advance the
Rule 1 interests.8 8
Finally, the indicia that proportionality has gained traction in
the courts as a result of the 2015 amendments extends to Rule 1.
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1 suggests its tie to propor-
tionality, 8 9 and the courts are starting to pair the two concepts.
For example, in Hyatt v. Rock, the court described the standard in
Rule 1 as "enveloping the interpretation of Rule 26."90
C. The Cooperation Assessment
Chief Justice Roberts described the amendment to Rule 1 as ex-
panding the scope of the rule by "a mere eight words" but charac-
terized those as "words that judges and practitioners must ake to
heart."91 Whereas the proportionality and spoliation amendments
seem to have achieved meaningful change, there is not yet any
evidence that either judges or practitioners have "taken to heart"
the new obligations in Rule 1. The courts pay some lip service to
the amendment in their opinions, but the data does not suggest
that the parties or the courts are invoking or applying Rule 1 in a
meaningfully different manner.
84. Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Tickle, No. 4:12-cv-01874, 2016 WL 393797, at *10
(M.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 2016).
85. Kost v. Hunt, No. 13-cv-583 (JNE/TNL), 2016 WL 5539768, at *4 (D. Min. Aug. 11,
2016).
86. Keister v. PPL Corp., 318 F.R.D. 247, 258 (M.D. Pa. 2015).
87. No. 15-9260-CM-GEB, 2016 WL 6163832, at *5 (D. Kan. Oct. 24, 2016) ("In direct
contravention of Rule l's directive to 'secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion' of this proceeding, a motion for leave would frankly only add to the cost and delay of
the case.").
88. No. 16-mc-80118-JSC, 2016 WL 6025155, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2016).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. I advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("Effective advocacy
is consistent with-and indeed depends upon-cooperative and proportional use of proce-
dure.").
90. No. 9:15-CV-0089 (DNH/DJS), 2016 WL 6820378, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016).
See also Waters v. Drake, No. 2:14-cv-1704, 2016 WL 4264350, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12,
2016) (discussing the interplay between Rules 1 and 26(b)(1) in a "Prefatory Statement").
91. C.J. ROBERTS, JR., supra note 36, at 5-6.
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With regard to the Duke Conference core needs of proportionali-
ty, cooperation, and active judicial case management, the amend-
ment to Rule 1 is the closest the amendments come to promoting
greater cooperation. Although this section uses the term "coopera-
tion" in its title and discussion, however, Rule 1 does not even use
the word "cooperation," much less attempt to mandate coopera-
tion. Rather, Rule 1 as amended and applied appears to impose
an obligation on each party separately and independently to em-
ploy the rules to obtain the just, speedy, and inexpensive determi-
nation of each action. Thus far, there is no evidence that the
amendment to Rule 1 has created a greater spirit of cooperation,
although that might admittedly be difficult to tease out of reported
opinions.
V. DISCOVERY COST-SHIFTING-RULE 26(c)(1)(B)
Another concern regarding the 2015 amendments pertained to
the authorization to shift the costs of responding to discovery from
the responding party to the requesting party. Although the de-
fault has always been that the responding party bears the cost of
responding to discovery requests, the courts have long had the
inherent authority to shift those costs to the requesting party,92
and the 2015 amendment simply codified that judge-made rule.
Scholars and other stakeholders worried that this new express
authority would result in cost-shifting becoming the norm, limit-
ing access to information for parties with limited resources.93
A. The Data
Cost-shifting certainly has not become the norm in the first year
of explicit authority in Rule 26(c)(1)(B). Only three decisions have
adjudicated a motion seeking a protective order shifting discovery
costs under the amended rule, with one court granting the mo-
tion.9 4 At the same time, that is three more motions than were
filed in the year prior to the 2015 amendments; not a single case
adjudicated a fee-shifting protective order request in 2015.
92. See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
93. Judge Shira A. Scheindlin from the Southern District of New York submitted a
comment stating that the new rule, in combination with Rule 26(b)(2)(B), "may encourage
courts to adopt a practice of requiring parties to pay for the discovery they request or to do
without." She opined that fee shifting "should not become our default position." DUKE
CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 11, Tab 2B, at 121.




B. The Cost-Shifting Assessment
The amendment to Rule 26(c) was billed as simply bringing the
rules into alignment with the practice without changing the de-
fault condition that the responding party incurs the cost of re-
sponding to discovery, and the results so far are consistent with
that objective. While it is potentially significant that the amend-
ment prompted three requests for fee-shifting protective orders in
the first year post-amendment as compared to none in the prior
year, the overall effect on civil litigation thus far is minimal.
With regard to the Duke Conference core needs of proportionali-
ty, cooperation, and active judicial case management, the Supreme
Court did not intend for the amendment to Rule 26(c) to address
any of those core needs, and it does not in practice seem to have
had any effect on any of those deficits.
VI. OFFICIAL FORMS-RULE 84
A. The Forms Judicial Gloss
Prior to December 1, 2015, Rule 84 established the official forms
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in one simple sentence:
"The forms in the Appendix suffice under these rules and illus-
trate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate."95
This one sentence accomplished two important purposes: alerting
judges and lawyers that the forms provided guidance as to the lev-
el of detail and complexity required in federal court papers (very
low); and establishing that a court paper that followed one of the
forms was deemed sufficient (and thus could not be challenged as
insufficient) under the rules.96
The 2015 amendments abrogated Rule 84 and eliminated the
federal forms. Scholars have bemoaned this amendment.97 Their
criticism stems back to the Supreme Court's revised pleading
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (repealed 2015).
96. See, e.g., McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
97. See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Abrogating Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process,
Civil Rule 84, and the Forms, 15 NEV. L.J. 1093 (2015). Professor Coleman argues that the
abrogation of Rule 84 and the forms was essentially an amendment to each of the Rules
that the forms illustrate, yet without publication and public comment. Professor Coleman
uses Rule 8 and Form 11 as an example. Form 11 was, arguably, the impetus for abrogating
Rule 84 and the forms. Form 11 contains a very simple negligence complaint, which most
scholars would agree falls short of the plausibility standard established by the Supreme
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). Eliminating Form 11, Cole-
man argues, was effectively amending the pleading standard in Rule 8, but without follow-
ing the procedures under the Rules Enabling Act. Coleman, supra.
Summer 2017 329
Duquesne Law Review
standard announced in Twombly98 and confirmed in Iqbal.99
Those cases, the argument runs, altered the pleading standard in
Rule 8 without subjecting the revisions to the amendment process,
in violation of the Rules Enabling Act.10 0 That new pleading
standard requires that pleadings contain enough factual allega-
tions to establish that each element of each claim is "plausible."1 0 1
Form 11 contains an extremely bare bones negligence complaint,
lacking virtually any factual content, and most commentators
agree that Form 11 would not satisfy the plausibility standard.102
Rather than attempt to fix Form 11, the Supreme Court opted to
do away with the official forms altogether.103
Accordingly, since Rule 84 has been abrogated, there are no
longer any opinions applying Rule 84 post amendments (and thus
no comparison data). Even while Rule 84 was in effect, however,
courts did not frequently apply the Rule-indeed, if anything they
discuss it slightly more in absentia. Courts have referenced the
abrogation of Rule 84 fourteen times in the first year post-
amendment, whereas they cited Rule 84 in the comparison period
thirteen times.
The most frequently cited form, both in the year before the ab-
rogation of Rule 84 and in the year following, is Form 18 for pa-
tent complaints.104 Prior to the abrogation of Rule 84, many courts
held that a direct infringement patent complaint was sufficient if
it complied with Form 18, without subjecting it to a rigorous
Twombly/Iqbal analysis.10 5 After the abrogation, many courts
have held that Form 18 no longer figures into the analysis.1 0 6
However, at least one court has held that the abrogation of Rule
84 should not change the standard for evaluating a direct patent
98. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
99. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
100. 28 U.S.C. § 2072. See Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the Formal Federal Civil
Rulemaking Process: Why the Court Should Not Amend Procedural Rules Through Judicial
Interpretation, 42 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 327, 330 (2011).
101. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662.
102. See, e.g., Sellers, supra note 100, at 372.
103. Id. at 373.
104. See, e.g., Robern, Inc. v. Glasscrafters, Inc., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1005, 1008-09 (D.N.J.
2016).
105. See, e.g., In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig., 681 F.3d
1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (holding that, to the extent "Twombly and its progeny conflict
with the Forms and create differing pleading requirements, the Forms control."); Arthrex,
Inc. v. W. Coast Med. Res., LLC, No. 8:15-cv-910-EAK-MAP, 2015 WL 12844946, at *2-3
(M.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 2015); Rosetta-Wireless Corp. v. Apple Inc., No. 15 C 799, 2015 WL
6955492, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 10, 2015).
106. See, e.g., Disc Disease Sols., Inc. v. VGH Sols., Inc., No. 1:15-cv-188 (LJA), 2016
WL 6561566, at *1 (M.D. Ga. 2016); e.Digital Corp. v. iBaby Labs, Inc., No. 15-cv-05790-
JST, 2016 WL 4427209, at *2-3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016).
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infringement complaint because the Advisory Committee Notes
specifically state that the abrogation was not intended to change
the pleading standards.107
B. The Forms Assessment
Chief Justice Roberts did not particularly elucidate the objec-
tives of Rule 84's abrogation. He opined that many of the forms
have become "antiquated or obsolete," but did not offer any reason
as to why the Court opted to eliminate the forms rather than mod-
ernize them.108 Leaving aside the wisdom, and even legality, of
abrogating the forms, the amendment abrogating Rule 84 certain-
ly accomplished the stated objective of eliminating the forms. As
the split in authority illustrates, however, the possibility exists
that the effects of the forms live on.
With regard to the Duke Conference core needs of proportionali-
ty, cooperation, and active judicial case management, as with the
amendment to Rule 26(c), the Supreme Court did not intend for
the abrogation of Rule 84 to cause any substantive changes, and it
does not in practice seem to have had any effect on any of those
deficits.
VII. PRODUCTION REQUESTS-RULE 34
Some of the revisions to Rule 34 are among the most profound
changes in the 2015 amendments, but they have received far less
attention from scholars and the other stakeholders. Because the
amended provisions are entirely new, there is no empirical basis
for a "before and after" comparison. The opinions applying
amended Rule 34, however, do raise some interesting issues.
A. The Document Requests Judicial Gloss
The Rule 34 amendment with the greatest potential impact is
the new requirement that parties who interpose objections to a
production request state whether they are withholding any docu-
ments on the basis of the objection.109 The purpose of the provi-
sion is to allow the requesting party to make a more informed de-
cision regarding whether to challenge the objection-the request-
107. See Hologram USA, Inc. v. Pulse Evolution Corp., No. 14-cv-0772-GMN-NJK,
2016 WL 199417, at *2 n.1 (D. Nev. Jan. 15, 2016).
108. C.J. ROBERTS, JR., supra note 36, at 8-9.
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(c) ("An objection must state whether any responsive materi-
als are being withheld on the basis of that objection.").
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ing party would be more likely to forgo a challenge if the respond-
ing party did not withhold any documents based on the objection
(conserving the parties' and the courts' resources).110
The new provision makes eminent sense, but compliance could
prove problematic in some circumstances. For example, if a term
in a document request is vague or ambiguous, a responding party
might have great difficulty in determining whether it has any
documents meeting the various alternative meanings of the term
that it is not producing.
The courts have yet to wrestle with this particular problem in a
reported opinion, but they have repeatedly addressed motions as-
serting that a party has failed to comply with the requirement o
disclose whether documents have been withheld. In the first year
of the amendment's effectiveness, courts issued sixteen opinions
discussing the requirement. Initially, the courts were lenient-
likely because of the newness of the provision-and simply or-
dered the responding party to supplement its response to comply
with the new Rule with no other sanction.' More recently, how-
ever, courts have started to sanction parties who fail to comply. 112
The manner in which parties must describe the documents they
are withholding on the basis of their objections is not explicitly
articulated in Rule 34(b)(2)(C). The Advisory Committee Note
suggests that a log, akin to a privilege log, is not required, and
that a statement describing limitations in the search used to col-
lect responsive documents i adequate.113 Thus far, courts seem to
be adhering to the Committee's suggested construction of the
Rule.114
110. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("This amendment
should end the confusion that frequently arises when a producing party states several
objections and still produces information, leaving the requesting party uncertain whether
any relevant and responsive information has been withheld on the basis of the objections.").
111. See, e.g., Scranton Prods., Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 3d
419, 437-38 (M.D. Pa. 2016); Douglas v. Kohl's Dep't Stores, Inc., No. 6:15-cv-1185-Orl-
22TBS, 2016 WL 1637277, at *3-4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 25, 2016).
112. See Asphalt Paving Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Combustion Corp., No. 6:15-cv-49-Orl-
41TBS, 2016 WL 3167712, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2016) (awarding attorney's fees against
the party failing to specify whether it withheld documents in its response).
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("The producing
party does not need to provide a detailed description or log of all documents withheld, but
does need to alert other parties to the fact that documents have been withheld and thereby
facilitate an informed discussion of the objection. An objection that states the limits that
have controlled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement
that the materials have been 'withheld."').
114. See Rowan v. Sunflower Elec. Power Corp., No. 15-cv-9227-JWL-TJJ, 2016 WL
3743102, at *5 (D. Kan. July 13, 2016) ("An objection that states the limits that have con-
trolled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a statement that the
materials have been 'withheld."').
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The 2015 amendment to Rule 34 also introduced language re-
quiring parties to state objections with specificity, eliminating an
unintended incongruity with the requirement in Rule 33 that ob-
jections to interrogatories be stated with specificity.1 15 Opinions
applying this new requirement for specificity in objections have
cast doubt about the continued viability of "general objections."
A common practice in responding to written discovery is to in-
clude a set of "general objections" at the beginning of the response,
in addition to the objections to specific discovery requests.11 6 In
the general objections, the responding party might object to any
improper instructions or definitions in the discovery request, and
might object to any broad, thematic aspects of the requests.1 17
Following the enactment of the 2015 amendments, parties have
challenged general objections. These challenges assail the generic
concept of general objections, not the particular general objections
raised in their opponents' discovery responses.1 18 These movants
have argued that a general objection fails, by its nature, to comply
with the specificity requirement in Rule 34(b)(2)(B), which re-
quires that a responding party state with specificity the objections
for "each item or category."119 Some courts have been persuaded,
holding general objections categorically insufficient. 120 Other
courts have stopped short of a categorical prohibition on general
115. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee's note to 2015 amendment ("Rule 34(b)(2)(B)
is amended to require that objections to Rule 34 requests be stated with specificity. This
provision adopts the language of Rule 33(b)(4), eliminating any doubt that less specific
objections might be suitable under Rule 34.").
116. See Johnson v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 236 F.R.D. 535, 538-39 (D. Kan. 2016).
117. See id.
118. See Meredith v. United Collection Bureau, Inc., No. 1:16 CV 1102, 2016 WL
6649279, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 10, 2016) (noting that the plaintiff had requested that the
court deem all general objections waived).
119. See id.
120. See, e.g., Nkansah v. Martinez, No. 15-646-JWD-RLB, 2016 WL 6595921, at *3 n.1
(M.D. La. Nov. 7, 2016) ("Pursuant to Rule 34(b)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, any objection must 'state with specificity the grounds for objecting to the request,
including the reasons.' Any general objection presumably applicable to all discovery re-
quests, that fails to comply with Rule 34, is insufficient and will not be considered by the
Court."); Auburn Sales, Inc. v. Cypros Trading & Shipping, Inc., No. 14-cv-10922, 2016 WL
3418554, at *3 (E.D. Mich. June 22, 2016) (holding that general objections do not satisfy the
requirement that, "[f]or each item or category" the response state objections with specificity;
with general objections it is unclear as to which requests the defendants objected and as to
which they produced documents); Asphalt Paving Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Combustion Corp., No.
6:15-cv-49-Orl-41TBS, 2016 WL 3167712, at *2 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2016) ("Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 34(b)(2)(B) provides that objections to requests for production shall 'state
with specificity the grounds for objection to the request, including the reasons.' The Court
does not consider frivolous, conclusory, general, or boilerplate objections.").
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objections, and analyze the objections individually under the new
specificity requirement.121
Further doubt regarding the continuing viability of general ob-
jections arises when the requirement o state whether documents
are being withheld on the basis of the objections is considered.
Because general objections speak to problems with the set of re-
quests as a whole, rather than problems with an individual re-
quest, the obligation to state whether the responding party is
withholding documents on the basis of the general objections is
awkward. For example, general objections are often where a re-
sponding party might object to any general definitions in the re-
quests. Determining whether the responding party is withholding
any documents on the basis of an objection to a vague definition
would entail not only considering the wording of the definition,
but also every individual request that uses the vaguely defined
term, then conducting a search for documents that might be re-
sponsive to any of the alternative meanings of the vague term.
Another typical general objection states that the responding
party objects to the instructions in the request to the extent that
they purport to impose greater obligations than those set forth in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Similarly, parties often in-
terpose a general objection "to the extent that the requests seek
documents outside the scope of discovery in Rule 26(b)(1)." It is
not readily apparent how parties are to assess whether they are
withholding documents as a result of general objections like these.
Thus far, the courts have not directly confronted this issue, and
the Advisory Committee Notes do not address it either.
While the 2015 amendment brought objections to Rule 34 doc-
ument requests into alignment with objections to Rule 33 inter-
rogatories in terms of the specificity requirement, the amendment
left a related inconsistency in place. Rule 33 expressly provides
that "[a]ny ground not stated in a timely objection is waived un-
less the court, for good cause, excuses the failure."122 Amended
Rule 34, curiously, does not contain a parallel waiver provision.
So far, the courts disagree as to whether this difference means
that parties do not waive objections to document requests if they
fail to assert them timely.123
121. See Meredith, 2016 WL 6649279, at *2 (declining to deem general objections
waived).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4).
123. Compare 17 Outlets, LLC Healthy Food Corp. v. ThurKen III, LLC, No. 15-cv-101-
JD, 2016 WL 6781217, at *2 (D.N.H. Nov. 16, 2016) ("Unlike Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 33, which governs interrogatories, Rule 34 does not include a waiver provision . ...
[T]he sanction of waiver is reserved for cases 'where the offending party committed unjusti-
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The 2015 amendments also changed Rule 34 to allow for early
service of document requests (in advance of the Rule 26(f) discov-
ery conference)12 4 and to allow the responding party to simply pro-
duce responsive documents instead of making them available for
inspection.12 5 These changes are appearing in the reported opin-
ions, but not in a way that is surprising or controversial.
B. The Document Requests Assessment
Curiously, Chief Justice Roberts did not even reference the
amendments to the document request provisions in Rule 34 in his
annual update. While the amendments to Rule 34 may not be as
controversial as some of the other amendments, they have the po-
tential to improve the litigation process meaningfully.
The process in which parties can serve document requests be-
fore they conduct their Rule 26(f) discovery conference and inter-
act with the court regarding the initial case management order, if
implemented in good faith and in the spirit embodied in Rule 1,
should make the litigation process flow more efficiently and pro-
portionally. Likewise, the requirement to disclose whether the
responding party is withholding documents on the basis of any
objections, now stated with specificity, should result in better de-
cisions by the requesting party regarding challenging the objec-
tions. As the judicial gloss section above illustrates, however, the
amended language leaves some uncertainty that has caused the
courts to struggle and, at times, to reach inconsistent decisions.
Accordingly, these provisions should be more and more successful
as the courts or further amendments refine the Rule.
With regard to the Duke Conference core needs of proportionali-
ty, cooperation, and active judicial case management, the amend-
ments to Rule 34 do not directly address any of these needs. They
primarily promote greater transparency in the objection process,
leading to a more informed decision regarding whether to chal-
lenge objections. That is a sensible objective, and should lead to
more cost-effective discovery, but does not really promote propor-
tionality in discovery. The new opportunity to serve early docu-
ment requests might foster greater cooperation if it leads parties
to work together to solve document production issues, rather than
merely enabling them to bring their disputes to the judge sooner.
fied delay in responding to discovery."'), with Sheets v. Villas, No. 8:15-cv-1674-T-30JSS,
2016 WL 6584877, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2016) (finding waiver).
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(d)(2) & 34(b)(2)(A).
125. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
Summer 2017 335
Duquesne Law Review
In any event, the amendments to Rule 34 do not directly advance
any of the core needs.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The sections above measure individual rule amendments
against their stated objectives. With the exception of the amend-
ment to Rule 1, the other amendments seem to be achieving their
goals. Parties and courts are injecting proportionality into the
discovery mix more vigorously. Courts are generally using a uni-
form standard when considering sanctions for spoliation of ESI.
Courts are requiring parties to assert their objections to document
requests with specificity, and are requiring them to declare
whether they are withholding documents on the basis of their ob-
jections. These individual amendments are the trees, and they
seem to be growing as envisioned when they were planted, save
for a branch here and there sprouting in an unanticipated direc-
tion.
But what about the forest? Are the 2015 amendments achieving
their "big picture" objectives, as articulated at the Duke Confer-
ence? Are they promoting "cooperation and proportionality [and]
sustained, active, hands-on judicial case management?" At the
forest level, the success of the 2015 amendments is less clear.
The collective data and the individual opinions suggest that, at
least over the first year, the 2015 amendments have quite success-
fully fertilized the growth of proportionality. It is unlikely that
even the most rabid supporter of these amendments would have
predicted that the courts would be applying Rule 26(b)(1) to limit
discovery they viewed as disproportional more than four times
more frequently in this first year post-amendments. The Advisory
Committee and the Supreme Court can certainly check the propor-
tionality box.
To cultivate more cooperation, the Committee added an adviso-
ry phrase to Rule 1 that does not use the word "cooperation," spec-
ifying explicitly that those who resist this advisement may not be
sanctioned as a result. Professor Mark Bennett's reaction to this
impotent measure was to quote tennis legend John McEnroe:
"YOU CANNOT BE SERIOUS."126 Although cooperation is diffi-
cult to quantify, and may be extremely difficult to mandate and
monitor, neither the collective data nor the individual opinions
reflect any change in the level of cooperation. Perhaps an attitude
126. See Bennett, supra note 5, at 1313.
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adjustment of this nature takes more than one year to manifest,
but based on the evidence currently available, the 2015 amend-
ments have thus far failed to foster an observable spirit of greater
cooperation.
To compel more active judicial case management, the Commit-
tee did . . . virtually nothing. While greater judicial management
is easy to legislate (in contrast to greater cooperation between ad-
versaries), the Advisory Committee and the Supreme Court opted
to encourage, rather than require, judges to actively manage their
cases. For example, Rule 16 makes it optional for a judge to meet
with the parties prior to issuing the initial case management or-
der.1 2 7 Judges only conduct such conferences 45% of the time.12 8
Thus, in over half the cases, the judge sets the time periods, lim-
its, and other parameters for discovery without even meeting with
the parties. Rule 16 could easily be amended to mandate such
conferences, but the Supreme Court has thus far resisted such a
mandate. Reported opinions yield no hint that judges are heeding
the Supreme Court's encouragement to actively manage cases.
For those who believe that "sustained, active, hands-on judicial
case management" is the one true sine qua non for material im-
provement in the federal civil litigation system, this was an oppor-
tunity lost.12 9
Meaningful change takes time, and often requires more than
one attempt. While the Advisory Committee and the Supreme
Court may eventually succeed in promoting greater cooperation
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(1).
128. EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL, CASE-
BASED CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 13 (2009).
129. The Committee has been encouraging active case management since at least 1983,
but the data suggest that judges have resisted changing their traditional roles. See Richard
L. Marcus, Slouching Towards Discretion, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1588 (2003) ("Be-
ginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require case management activity by all judges in
most cases, and to encourage more managerial activity than was required."); David L.
Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1969, 1984-87 (1989) (describing the history of Rule 16 and the purposes of the 1983
amendment). Amending the rules to mandate a more active role for judges may be the only
way to change most judges' behavior, and the present litigation climate makes the need for
managerial judges more compelling. Not only is there a rare consensus among parties on
"both sides of the v" that the process benefits from such active judges, the current decline in
jury trials has diminished the historic primary role of judges. See Jonathan T. Molot, An
Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 34-36 (2003); Victor Eugene
Flango, Judicial Roles for Modern Courts, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, http://www.
ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2013/home/Monthly-Trends-
Articles/Judicial-Roles-for-Modern-Courts.aspx (last visited Sept. 7, 2017) ("Yet we all have
a conception of what a judge should be-a distinguished person presiding over a trial.").
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and active judicial case management, the early returns suggest
that they have more work to do.
Why did the amendments appear to have succeeded in fostering
more robust application of the proportionality doctrine but not in
promoting cooperation or active judicial case management? One
factor may be the Supreme Court's willingness to be more di-
rective in its amendments regarding proportionality; the Supreme
Court may be reluctant to direct the lower court judges as to how
to manage their dockets. Another less obvious one, though, might
be marketing. Because Chief Justice Roberts emphasized and
urged proportionality in his annual report discussing the 2015
amendments, district court judges were primed to consider the
issue, as evidenced by numerous lower court opinions quoting his
report in their discussions of proportionality.13 0
The amendment process is designed such that the Advisory
Committee prepares draft amendments, publishes them for public
comment, responds to the public comments, and then submits
them to the Supreme Court along with Advisory Committee
Notes.131 Judges and lawyers then rely on that record, and in par-
ticular the Advisory Committee Notes, to construe the amend-
ments. In the case of the 2015 amendments, however, lower court
judges have relied heavily on Justice Roberts's annual report-a
document external to the "legislative history" of the amendments.
Whether this degree and type of influence by one individual is ap-
propriate warrants careful consideration.
130. See, e.g., United States v. Talmage, No. 1:16-cv-19-DN-PMW, 2017 WL 1047315,
at * 2 (D. Utah Mar. 17, 2017); Mcswain v. United States, No. 2:15-cv-01321-GMN-GWF,
2016 WL 4530461, at *3 (D. Nev. Aug. 30, 2016); Grober v. Mako Prod. Inc., No. 2:04 CV
8604 JZ (DTBx), 2016 WL 7429139, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2016).
131. See STEVEN BAICKER-MCKEE, WILLIAM M. JANSSEN & JOHN B. CORR, FEDERAL
CIVIL RULES HANDBOOK, Pt. I, 2-5 (2017 ed.).
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